Volume 38

Issue 1

Article 5

December 1931

Critical Examination of Peace Agencies Since 1919
Gilbert Gidel
University of Paris

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gilbert Gidel, Critical Examination of Peace Agencies Since 1919, 38 W. Va. L. Rev. (1931).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol38/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
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CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PEACE AGENCIES
SINCE 1919
GLBERT GIEIiP

I intend to consider the practical value of the various means
aiming at the prevention of war that have been suggested or put
into effect since 1919. Why since 19197 I do not think that
international law was created in 1919. But, whether one wishes
it or not, an effort, unprecedented until now, has been devoted to
the study of the technique of peace. The struggle against war is
no longer limited to sentimental effusions, or fireside dreams: it
has become an object of science; even of applied science.
The program of the technique of peace is generally formulated today in three words: arbitration, security, disarmament.
Under the generic name of arbitration are included, in this
case, 'all means of pacific settlement of international disputes:
mediation, conciliation, arbitration properly so-called, and international justice.
Under the term, security, the following questions are designated: the prevention of the breaking out of a war if it is being
prepared; the throttling of a war if it has already broken out;
the prevention, in the event that a war has already broken out, of
its achieving results that are held to be unjust.
Arbitration and security, must, in this program, open the
way to disarmament, the philosopher's stone of politico-judicial
alchemy.
I shall leave complefely aside, within the limits of this article,
everything that concerns arbitration and, likewise, everything that
concerns disarmament in order to limit myself strictly to the problem of security.
The essential difficulty of the problem of security is that it
involves an attempt to apply juridic means to the solution of
political questions: that is, an attempt to square the circle.
The goal to be attained was set forth in the Fourteenth Point
of President Wilson's message: "to obtain for all states, large and
small equally, mutual guarantees of political independence and
territorial integrity".
Territorial integrity is bound up with the state of territorial
possession existing at a given moment. This state of possession has
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its origin in treaties concluded at the end of a war, which contain
the conditions imposed by the victor, by means of force, upon the
conquered state. The victor generally desires to preserve this
state of affairs. In 1815 Prince Metternich wrote in a letter to his
sovereign, the Emperor of Austria: "One of the first principles,
I should even say the basis, of contemporary polities, is, and must
be, quiet. Now, the fundamental idea of quiet is security in
possession." That is the victor's point of view. On the other
hand, the vanquished state will not resign itself to the acceptance
of treaties which it has been obliged to sign; and it seeks to have
them modified. International Law does not funish the solution
of this antagonism: on the one hand it does not admit that duress
is a cause for the nullity of international treaties; nor does it, on
the other hand, admit the necessary perpetuity of treaties. While
proclaiming the sanctity of treaties, international law makes them
less rigid by the reservation, called in scholastic language "'clausuZa
rebus sic stantibus." It understands perfectly that immobility is
incompatible with the nature of the existing world; it is quite
ready to agree with Leibnitz that eternal peace will not be found
outside of the graveyard!
At the end of every war the problem of security resolves itself for the victor into the maintenance of the existing state of
affairs, and for the conquered nation, to a modification of this
same state of affairs. There exists, from a juridical point of
view, no manner of attributing more value to one than to the
other of these two contrary conceptions. A treaty is not necessarily just because the victor was sufficiently strong to impose it,
nor necessarily unjust because the conquered state had to submit
to it. The subversion of existing treaties can be as contrary to
justice as the maintenance of the same treaties, and vice versa.
Likewise, the problem of security, towards the solution of
which the technique of peace seeks to apply juridical means, is
essentially connected in its initial conception with the state of
territorial possession, which is a political concept. Thus the
juridical theorems of security must always be based upon a political postulate of varying content.
Formerly, moreover, less ambitiously, and, perhaps, more
wisely, no solution of the problem of security was sought outside
of political combinations. Security was sought in alliances. The
events of 1914 and the following years have cast much discredit
on alliances-whether rightly or wrongly, does not matter; this
is not the place to discuss it. In 1919 alliances were condemned:
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in the place of particular and permanent alliances, it was proposed
that there should be substituted, whenever the need arose, a general and temporary alliance against the disturber of the juridical
order: this great alliance would rise, so to speak, from the earth at
the very moment when the international charter were violated, but
would be dissolved as soon as the juridical order were restored.
The structure of the international organization demands, therefore: that all states live within the bonds of a common juridical
order; that respect for this common juridical order should set
aside the pursuit of all individual aims outside the statutes of the
Association; that every individual alliance be, therefore, in principle, suspect since it is directed towards individual aims; that the
violation of the common juridical order immediately array against
the violator all the other members until the violator be punished.
By its very nature, every complete international organization includes a mutual guaranty.
By what means may this guaranty be practically realized?
By the employment, against the violator of the established juridical
order, of economic or of military means. Economic means seem
easier to employ than military assistance: the sacrifices demanded
of the members of the organization seem less burdensome. It is
simply a question of severing all relations, commercial and financial, with the state which must be brought to terms. But the
effects of the economic arm are slow to be felt; all the more slow
since the state against which they are to be directed will, in advance, have made all the arrangements in its power to render inoperative the effects of the blockade. It will be difficult to
guarantee the strictness of the blockade; it can give results only on
condition of being general. Finally, the economic arm has complex effects, incalculable incidences. Speaking of its employment,
Sir Austin Chamberlain said, in 1925, before the Council of the
League of Nations: "nothing allows us to believe that the guilty
state will be overcome, nor even that it will suffer the most." The
Covenant of the League of Nations provided for the use of the
economic arm against states violating the Covenant: not only has
the economic arm never been used, but even the League interpretation of the rules in accordance with which it may be used has always been restrictive.
There remain the military, naval, and aeronautical means.
Their efficacy is evident. But the difficulty lies in the manner
of their use. Should the use be general or particular, arranged
and exercised against the violator of the juridical order by all the
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members of the organization or by certain ones? At first sight
the answer seems clear: the general engagement undertaken by
all the members of an international organization to come to the
aid of that one of their members who may be menaced, seems,
practically, the surest as well as the one most in accord with the
spirit of an organization which tends to condemn all individual
alliances. Upon closer inspection, however, the efficacy of general action appears less certain. It is the characteristic of a treaty
of general assistance that it be applicable in whatever hypothesis
may arise; when these hypotheses exceed a certain number it is
impossible for the treaty to respond to the requirements of all
individual cases. Moreover, no action can be efficacious unless it
has been concerted in advance: how could this necessity be met
in a treaty of general assistance. It is hardly possible to imagine
the heads of the general staffs of all the nations communicating
all the details of their armed forces to all the other states which are
members of the organization with the aim of preparing for possible
action against any one of the other states, and, therefore, against
their own country as well. Finally, an essential weakness of the
general treaty of mutual assistance is concerned with the appraisal
of the "casus foederis (the basis for joint action)." Who shall
be judge of whether there has been a violation of law obliging the
other states to act against the violator? If it be within the jurisdiction of a common body to declare that the case provided for
by the guaranty has occurred, and that the states are under obligation to act, what has become of the member-states' sovereignty?
If it be within the power of each state to make this decision it is
almost certain that an agreement will be unobtainable and that
action in common, obligatory on paper, will resolve itself on the
one hand, into abstentions, and on the other, into individual actions,
more or less discordant, and perhaps, even into conflicts.
Only individual obligations of guaranty and individual
treaties of assistance offer a chance of effectiveness: the preparations for assistance being made in view of a given hypothesis,
may be precise and adapted to the circumstances; it is possible to
evaluate their effectiveness in advance; they may be put into
effect immediately; the determination of the "casus foederis"
will be simple, thanks to the previous discussions carried on by
the interested parties. But one must not conceal the fact that
any individual engagement of assistance or guaranty, in whatever form or under whatever name it may be (Treaty of Guaranty,
Treaty of Neutrality, Treaty of Non-Aggression) is nothing but
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a treaty of alliance and that it is, under any circumstances, in
contradiction with the fundamental idea of any general world
organization or organization of any part of the world.
Thus, the practical consideration of the means applicable to
the realization of security brings us back to the individual alliances
condemned by the pure doctrine of an international organization.
As the political considerations and the individual ambitions
of states move in the same direction as the practical exigencies of
the effective functioning of the guaranties, the necessary consequence is the reconstitution, within a more or less short period, of
individual alliances, even within the international organizations
whose theoretical basis demands their condemnation.
The ideas which have been thus brought out by reasoning are
strikingly confirmed by the experience of the last ten years of the
activities of the League of Nations. This experience proves: (1)
The impossibility of organizing effectively the general guaranty
provided for by the Covenant; (2) by a necessary consequence of
the failure of the organization of the general guaranty, the return
to individual alliances, even more numerous than they were before
1914, either to insure or to prevent the working of the guaranty.
Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations provides
that all the states members of the League undertake to respect and
maintain against all external aggression the territorial integrity
and the political independence of all the members of the League.
There can be nothing clearer than the text: the obligation to respect the territorial integrity of the other states, that is, that
each state abstain from infringing thereon; the obligation to compel respect for the territorial integrity of the other states, that
is, to take steps and to furnish the necessary means in order to
achieve this effect. And, Article X of the Covenant adds: In case
of aggression, of threat or of danger of aggression the Council
shall advise concerning the means of assuring the execution of
this obligation.
How has this Article X worked ?
In May 1920 Persia suffered from the disembarkation of
Bolshevist troops in one of its ports on the Caspian Sea. Persia
was a member of the League of Nations; she asked the Council of
the League of Nations to apply as an aid to Persia, the arrangements of Article X; called together in London in June, the Council
gave Persia the comfort of wishing her full success in the negotiations which it bade her carry on with the Soviets. A few weeks
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later, and again in connection with the Soviets, a new case presented itself for the application of Article X. Poland was invaded by the Soviet armies which had advanced to the gates of
Warsaw: one of the states which were permanent members of
the Council declared that it would take no part in the Council's
undertaking any action based on Article X. The Poles were
saved only through their own energy directed against the invader,
in accordance with the strategic plans of General Weygand, sent
in haste by France in view of the inactivity of the League of
Nations.
Article X of the Covenant has not been put to the test a third
time, probably because the two incidents following so closely the
time when it went into effect, appeared conclusive. Well, Article
X is, to use the words of the great inspirer of the Covenant, "the
veritable backbone of the entire Covenant," the undertaking
"without which the League would be only a superior debatingclub." It has been impossible, however, either to apply Article
X, to eliminate it, or to make unanimous the interpretation of it.
It could not be eliminated, for, without it, the Covenant
would be without meaning as far as security is concerned. It
cduld not be interpreted because its execution is necessarily handed over to the individual good will of each individual state: in
effect, the Covenant obliges the signatories mutually to abstain
from any act of aggression and mutually to defend each other
against any act of aggression: but nowhere does it define what
must be understood as aggression. Vain, moreover, has been
every succeeding attempt.
The definition of agression is not a problem belonging solely
to the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is a problem of all
times. It is the key-stone of the justness of war, which is itself
from one point of view the crucial point of international law.
Either it is necessary to pass a qualitative judgment on war, and
from this judgment must flow all the consequences that it admits
of; or international law must abstain from passing any qualitative
judgment on war: and then it escapes from the bounds of law in
the same fashion as an inundation, a cyclone, or a volcanic eruption. But, every qualitative judgment on war presupposes that
there exists a definition or aggression.
The concept of aggression can be sought by following two
different paths. The criterion of aggression may be sought in the
justice of the war, in the justa causa of St. Augustine and of the
doctors of the Church. Thus Gregory of Tours praised the wars
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of the King of the Franks, Clovis, as so many acts of justice "for"
said he, "he marched before the Lord with a righteous heart and
did what was favorable in His sight." The world would find itself very much embarrassed today should it try to agree upon a
substantial criterion of a just act.
Or else, the concept of aggression may be looked for amongst
criteria of pure formality: Was the war begun after the proper
sacramental procedures had been observed? In Rome, it was upon
the so-called 'festialis," a special class of priest, that the responsibility for these actions was placed. War in Rome was "just" if
the "festialis" pronounced the ritual phrases and threw the lance
on enemy soil. Once, to make matters easier, the Roman Senate
caused a soldier of Pyrrhus' army who had fled to Rome to purchase some land in the "pomaerium."
On this land, which had
thus become enemy soil, the "festiaiis" carried out the customary
ritual. It is to formal criteria that, today, international law must
have recourse, for lack of any universal idea of justice. Did the
belligerant states exhaust all the pacific methods for the settlement of disputes that were open to them before taking up arms?
In view of the impossibility of determining whether or not a war
is just, there will be an attempt to discover whether or not it is
licit. The war of aggression is never lawful.
But who shall be considered the aggressor? Mere priority in
the commencement of military operation has never been a conclusive means of determining the aggressor. The conditions of
modern warfare have called forth new difficulties. The imminence
of war is no longer recognizable solely in troop mobilization: it
can be discerned in the augmentation of the supplies of certain
raw materials, in the intensification of the manufacture of certain
articles, from the carrying on of certain financial transactions.
If the nation open to attack neglects the necessary counter
measures, it will be seriously out distanced on the day when the
troop movements begin. Which of the two will be the aggressor?
At what time will be said to occur aggression, menace of aggression, danger of aggression; three situations expressly referred to
in Article X of the Covenant, without the least effort at defining
them?
The definition of agression-if not of the menace of aggression or of the danger of aggression-has been attempter several
times since the making of the Covenant. The projected treaty of
General Assistance, proposed in 1923 and almost immediately
abandoned, attempted the negative method; being unable to say
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what an aggressor might be, they tried to say who was not the
aggressor. But this document proceeded simply by way of examples: it gave no definition, not even a negative one.
The Protocol of Geneva took up the task: it was born at the
meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1924 on the
initiative of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. It never recovered from
the mortal blow dealt it in 1925 by Sir Austin Chamberlain, the
Foreign Secretary of Mr. Baldwin's Cabinet. The Geneva Protocol
had taken over as a definition of aggressor a criterion suggested
by the American professor, Mr. Shotwell, in the summer of 1924:
in the event of hostilities being engaged in (the Protocol wisely
refrains from saying by whom) that state shall be considered the
aggressor which failed to observe the stipulated pacific procedures.
In order that this presumption might be held valid in the case of
any nation, a decision of the Council of the League, rendered by
unanimous vote, and, therefore, almost impossible to obtain, was
necessary. The method was ingenious, but the definition was incomplete, for all questions capable of causing wars were not submitted to procedures of pacific settlement.
Three or four years had passed since the Geneva Protocol had
carried with it into the graveyard a new condemnation of the war
of aggression-always without a definition of aggression-when
there was signed at Paris on the 27th of August 1928 "The Multilateral Pact for the Renunciation of War" which I shall call, for
the sake of brevity and in the European style, the Briand-Kellogg
or the Kellogg Pact. I hasten to say that the new documentelaborated outside of the League of Nations-makes not even one
inch of progress in the problem of the war on the war of aggression.
M. Briand's original intention was solely concerned with a
simple bi-lateral treaty between the United States and France
which would renew the previous treaties of arbitration and conciliation which were soon due to expire, and which would outlaw
war in the two states' relations. The State Department believed
that such a treaty would appear to be a treaty of alliance; it demanded a multi-lateral pact. It was in this direction that negotiations were commenced and they became terribly complicated.
The outlawing of war in plain and simple terms and without
further precision was possible in Franco-American relation; this
simplicity disappeared in a treaty signed by fourteen nations.
Each one of these countries set forth in documents of a different
type the meaning which it intended to attribute to the proposed
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text of the Pact, and which, moreover, all the countries were willing to sign. Italy expressed a desire to understand exactly the
meaning and the extent of the document to which its assent was
sought, and, while agreeing with the text which the Department
of State had communicated to her, suggested the formation of a
committee of jurists of the countries signatories of the pact in
order to determine the situations which would result from the
working of the Pact. Washington found the proposal unacceptable; even if the study had been undertaken, it would have
achieved no success.
What assures a limitless pasture for the jurists' wisdom is,
first, this: the majority of the original signatories of the Kellogg
Pact did not proceed to the signature of the document until they
had given the interpretations of the Pact by which they intended
to determine the obligations which they considered that they had
assumed; these interpretations are not in agreement with each
other; the Kellogg Pact is open to adhesion by other states; certain other states (Turkey, Persia and Egypt, for example) announced their refusal to accept certain particular interpretations;
certain other (for example, the Soviet Union) rejected all the
interpretations and restricted themselves entirely to the text of
the Pact.
I know very well that, in a statement to the Press on the 8th
of August 1928 Mr. Kellogg declared that "the interpretations
of the pact are in no way a part of the Pact and cannot be considered as reservations. The interpretations will not be deposited
along with the text of the Treaty." It was in this manner that
the proceedings were carried out. But we know very well, however, that it is to these "interpretations" that all the signatory
states have subordinated their adhesion to the Pact, and the
Kellogg Pact was ratified by the United States Senate only after
it had taken official cognizance of the report wherein the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, acting under the
Senate's authorization, had set forth the precise meaning which it
had attached to the act of the 27th of August. These various interpretations are all equally valid juridically. There is one which
-no matter what fate may hold in store for the Kellogg Pacthas gained a durable reputation: it is the interpretation of Great
Britain. By its note of the 19th of May 1928, Britain formulated
a sort of British "Monroe Doctrine" but which left undetermined
the zones to which the doctrine is to be applied.
The interpretations to which the nations' signatures have been
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subordinated do not constitute the only difficulty raised by the
Briand-Kellogg Pact. He is a lucky man who can tell what sort
of wars the very text itself intends to outlaw! The Pact proclaims the outlawry of war "as an instrument of national policy."
What does this mean? The simple notion of war is sufficient of
itself to provoke serious questionings? Shall they be classed as
wars those "exercises of international police" about which President Roosevelt used to speak, which the United States, he said,
might be compelled to undertake, quite against its will, in flagrant
cases due to chronic disorder or absence of control which had as
an inevitable aftermath an overthrow of the laws of civilized
society? But what is a war considered as an "instrument of national policy"? It cannot be a war of aggression, since such a
war is nowhere defined; even less can it be a defensive war, since
the legitimacy of such wars was formally acknowledged in the
communications of the State Department preliminary to the signature of the Kellogg Pact.
I wish also to point out that any plan for the repression of a
war undertaken in disregard of the Pact's provisions-supposing
that meaning were established-is not to be found within the
terms of the treaty. It marks a retrogressi6n, therefore, from the
point of view of the technique of peace from the position taken in
the Covenant of the League of Nations, in Article X and XVI
of which an attempt was made to establish sanctions, a regression
from the attempts of the Draft Treaty of General Assistance and
the Geneva Protocol. It has been said with justice that it is
only "a sort of second Covenant with the difference that it stops
at the preamble."
Before leaving the Kellogg Pact, I must briefly mention the
manner in which it has been applied on the one occasion, if I am
not mistaken, of its use. In 1929 a sanguinary encounter arose
between China and the Soviet Union in relation to the Eastern
Asiatic Railroad. Five months of armed conflict had already
passed when the State Department took the initiative of proposing
to the signatory states that they call to the attention of the
governments of Moscow and Nanking the existence of the Multilateral Pact for the Renunciation of War. At that time the
Chinese were already defeated and compelled to commence negotiations with the Soviets. Thus the only attempt to invoke the
Pact was not very successful.
The lack of success met with by the various general attempts
to solve the problem of security by means of organizing the obliga-
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tions of the Covenant and of repressing what it terms "wars of
aggression", has turned the European nations back to a search for
individual solutions of the problem.
The Locarno treaties constitute the type of plurilateral
regional ententes aiming at security. In place of general accords
following an ideal plan there have been substituted particular
arrangements deeply rooted in political relations.
The system of Locarno is of British origin: it is directly connected with the failure of the Geneva Protocol. In 1925 Great
Britain categorically refused to engage itself under the terms of
the Geneva Protocol which might have forced her to take part in
conflicts in any part of the world where, in the general interest,
her naval power might be called on; but she was willing to conclude a treaty of guaranty limited to a region wherein her own
security is compromised by any eventual conflict. In a communication to the Council of the League of Nations of the 12th of
March 1925 Sir Austin Chamberlain declared that it was necessary
"to fight against the danger of war undertaken as an instrument
of conquest or revenge". To this end it is necessary to join together the countries most directly interested and those whose differences might give birth to conflicts, by means of treaties
elaborated with the sole object of maintaining the desired peace
between these nations. The solution of the problem of security
must be found in regional ententes born from individual treaties
of mutual assistance and reciprocal guaranties.
The Locarno system issued from this program. Great Britain
thereby replaces by means of a kind of neutralization of the region
of the Rhine the advantages which she received from the neutrality
of.Belgium solemnly established in 1839, which failed on the 3rd
of August 1914 and has not been reestablished since then. Locarno
seeks to stabilize the frontiers of the region of the Rhine by the
institution of a system of pacific procedures to prevent conflicts
between France, Belgium, and Germany, and the institution in
this region of a guaranty assumed by Great Britain and Italy.
This guaranty is, on their part, purely potential, for the organ
which passes judgment on its application is the Council of the
League whose decisions must be unanimous 'and of which both
guarantors-Great Britain and Italy-are permanent members.
"I do not think," said Sir Austin Chamberlain in the House of
Commons, "that the obligations of Great Britain could be more
strictly limited." The effective value of the Locarno Pact is left
to the political spirit of Great Britain: that is, a land which faces
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the European Continent, but whose frontiers on European coasts
run on the North Sea and the Channel, or, more exactly, from
Rotterdam to Le Havre.
Locarno marked the beginning of an orientation towards individual, realistic and political solutions of the problem of security.
Since 1925 there has sprung up an abundant crop of bi-lateral
treaties concluded under different names, treaties of guaranty,
neutrality, non-aggression, assistance, and others; they have arrived at the point of binding almost all the countries of Europe
into opposed political systems. Whether they are made between
states members of the League, between members and non-members,
or between states not members, in no case have the treaties tended
to create a feeling of concord or calm.
In 1928, in face of this uninterrupted development of agreements individual in form and aim, the League attempted to take
the new practice under its wing and to lead it into a path in conformity with the spirit of the Covenant. But to obtain this, the
League had to throw overboard much ballast. In the two models
of treaties of non-aggression, one bi-lateral, the other general,
that the League proposed to its members in 1928, it incorporated
the negative obligation of Article X, that which obliges the members of the League mutually to respect the other members' territorial integrity. But the positive obligation contained in Article
X, that of causing the other members' territorial integrity to be
respected and maintained against aggression no longer has the
same absolute and unconditional form which the Covenant gave
it: the engagement of military assistance is subordinated to the
declaration made by the Council of the League of Nations-and
hence, of necessity unanimous-that the adversary state has had
undue recourse to war.
In 1919 the Covenant proclaimed the obligation to suppress
a crime; in 1928 the text that the League of Nations proposes for
its members' signature pretty nearly contents itself with an absence of complicity!
Such is the deceptive history of the efforts consecrated during
the past ten years or so to the problem of security. The failure
of these efforts should not surprise us. To seek the solution of
international security in definitions and mechanisms is valueless
up to the very moment when those problems to which they are
applicable can do without them. Sir Austen Chamberlain criticised the attempt to define aggression suggested by the Geneva
Protocol: "I remain opposed," said he, "to this attempt to define
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the 'aggressor' because I believe it will be a trap for the innocent
and a signpost for the guilty."
International problems, like social questions, are, basically
nothing but moral questions. A traveler once spoke of certain
inns in Spain where you get to eat what you bring with you. The
law resembles these inns; it works according to ideas which it has
not created; it limits itself to laying down the technical rules
which allow these ideas to work, and to assure their realization in
practice. International Law partakes of this character more than
any other branch of law: in every civilized nation there exist
forces capable of compelling the inhabitants, if not to true
morality, at least to a moral attitude; these forces are lacking in
international society, at least, as established institutions. Each
country has the laws it deserves; each age has the international
law which answers to its moral development. International law
of today places an imposing number of useful instruments at the
disposal of those who sincerely desire peace and understanding
between nations; but these mechanisms carry with them all the
means of ridding themselves of unfortunate commitments and
leave to states the possibility of making in their obligations a
choice according to their political interests.
It is too frequently believed that peace must result from the
interdependence of peoples. The interdependence of peoples does
really exist: an economic crisis in one has a repercussion in
another. But the interdependence of peoples is a simple material
fact; it is by no means a solidarity of peoples, which is a moral
concept. It even happens that interdependence and solidarity are
in inverse ratio to each other.
Great illusions result from the commonplaces about peace
which are current. It can be said that pacific commonplaces have
become standardized throughout the world; it is not through them
that peace will be established. Peace will only arise from the will
to have peace. But that depends on a great many on the line
conditions connected with unfair competition which now prevail
without regulation in the international field.
If this will is lacking amongst all peoples, peace will only be
maintained by the action, as energetic as is necessary, of those who
have this will in their relations with those who lack it. It is the
idea at the basis of the organization of all societies of civilized
individuals. It is strange that when it is a question of the society
of nations the same idea is not held to be valid.
The nations have not yet reached this idea, upon which repose
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the individual societies, that injustice done towards one is a menace to all. The repercussion of injustice is propagated in international society by waves infinitely slower than those of national
societies: the activities of the policeman and the judge are not
there to aid in the propogation of these waves. I do not overlook
that the causes of war are much more deepseated than any international formal organization can reach. My time does not admit a
discussion of unfair competition which makes international relatfons such as they are.
It does not suffice that war be proclaimed an international
crime. This proclamation will be valueless until it is accompanied
in international society by sanctions corresponding to those which
exist in national societies.
The treaties which have fulminated against war have not
dared to set up sanctions of this nature. The most progressive
texts (the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva
Protocol) suffered from an astonishing lack of accord (one which
no internal legislation has ever permitted) between the crime and
its punishment.
War was qualified as an "international crime" and it was
treated like a simple civil ease where the malefactor whose plans
had failed, would only have to pay reparation for certain damages.
At the beginning of the 17th century Crotius had stated the
principles of a true international criminal law: there are criminal
nations as there are individual criminals. Both should be punished. Sir Austen Chamberlain announced the same idea when
he criticized the absence of sanctions in the Geneva Protocol. "It
is possible that the act of aggression has been unprovoked, carried
out barbarously, that it be the deed of a tyrannical and corrupt
government. Ought we, therefore to erect as a principle that the
League of Nations shall do nothing to prevent the recurrence of
these crimes, except to demand money?"
The problem is, certainly, redoubtable, for the application of
sanctions supposes not only force, but likewise justice, objectivity
and absence of passions. These qualities presuppose amongst the
nations a degree of moral elevation which they have not yet
achieved, even if they will achieve it some day. Up to now it is
only the consciousness of an immediate common danger and immediate common interests which have created common action.
Peace has not yet been conceived of as the common material and
moral interest of all nations.
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While awaiting such time as moral perfection shall be the
lot of humanity, or-and this would, perhaps, suffice-of all governments, there will be no peace in the world until the day when
a certain number of states, attached to the idea of Peace, with an
elevated conception- of justice, and representing material forces
evidently superior to those of the states who believe it to their interest to disturb the peace, will be able to declare themselves ready
to join forces in common action against any state whatever which
shall try to settle its own quarrels instead of submitting them to
the international judge and accepting his decisions. As an American statesman said, "it would be necessary that all countries find
it to their interest to uphold the law, desire that the law be observed, and act in consequence."
There you have the problem. It is not in the construction of
mechanisms more or less complicated and learned. To place one's
hopes for the maintenance of peace in a simple soulless machine is
to show as much imprudent candor as did the "verger" whose
story I read somewhere.
"The present Church of the Holy Trinity in Guildford occupies the site of an earlier building which was destroyed in 1740,
when the steeple fell and carried the roof with it. One of the first
persons to be informed of the disaster was the verger. 'It is impossible,' he exclaimed, 'for I have the key in my pocket!' 1
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